preliminary version — under legal review before commercial publication
Privacy

What we collect — and what we refuse to collect.

The hard part of privacy is not the policy: it is the design. Much of what follows is not a promise, it is the absence of a path in the code. The corresponding technical document is SEGURANCA.md, handed to the client's IT team during evaluation.

What the tool stores

  • User identification: name, work email and access profile
  • Password verifier (scrypt with a per-user salt) — never the password
  • Diagnostic sessions: the text written by the manager, the answers and the results
  • The situation's label (team, project or process name)
  • Access audit record: sign-in, failure, lockout and sign-out

What it does not store

  • A person's name as a situation label — refused at entry, by the engine
  • Profile, grade, score or classification of an individual — it exists nowhere
  • Anyone's activity, messages, emails or productivity metrics
  • Any connection to the client's internal databases — the tool does not integrate with them
  • Sensitive data on the website: this site uses no analytics cookies and no third-party trackers

Minimum aggregation of n ≥ 5

The organisation's panel suppresses any slice with fewer than five sessions. Suppression happens in storage, not on screen — slicing filters successively does not get around it.

The session belongs to the manager

No other user reads a manager's session, not even by direct link. The response for another author's session is identical to that of a session that does not exist.

Support leaves a trace

Support access only exists with a record visible to the session's owner. The record is append-only: there is no delete operation.

No path back

The aggregate has no drill-down to the individual session. It is an absent route, not an unchecked permission — there is no key to join on.